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[Italians] have always flourished under a strong hand, whether Caesar’s or Hildebrand’s, Cavour’s or 
Crispi’s. That is because they are not a people like ourselves or the English or the Germans, loving order 
and regulation and government for their own sake....When his critics accuse [Mussolini] of 
unconstitutionality they only recommend him the more to a highly civilized but naturally lawless people. 
(Anne O’ Hare McCormick, New York Times Magazine, July 22, 1923) 
 
 
In this paper I will try to outline the emergence of the idea of Atlantic Community 
(from now on AC) during and in the aftermath of World War II and the peculiar, 
controversial place of Italy in the AC framework. Both among American policymakers 
and in public discourse, especially in the press, AC came to define a transatlantic space 
including basically North American and Western European countries, which supposedly 
shared political and economic principles and institutions (liberal democracy, individual 
rights and the rule of law, free market and free trade), cultural traditions (Christianity 
and, more generally, “Western civilization”) and, consequently, national interests.  
While the preexisting idea of Western civilization was defined mainly in cultural-
historical terms and did not imply any institutional obligation, now the impeding threat of 
the cold war and the confrontation with the Communist block demanded the commitment 
to be part of a “community” with shared beliefs and needs, in which every single member 
is responsible for the safety and prosperity of all the other members. The obvious 
political counterpart of such a discourse on Euro-American relations was the birth of the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) on April 4, 1949. 
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Before and after 1949 American mainstream media like LIFE magazine and many 
others represented the AC as a natural alliance of nations and peoples which was rooted 
in history and whose degree of cohesiveness had now been strengthened by an 
international situation marked by the confrontation against Nazi and later Communist 
totalitarianism, but whose rationale was wider and deeper than the contingencies of cold 
war ideological warfare. However, I argue, the shaping of such an Euro-American AC 
involved a fair amount of arbitrariness and at times even “invention,” let alone political 
expediency. My focus on photojournalism - and specifically on LIFE magazine - rests on 
the assumption that LIFE strongly contributed to the shaping of the AC framework as a 
cultural construction and, therefore, a critical focus on that magazine allows to expose the 
artificial nature of such a framework more clearly than diplomatic correspondence and 
minutes of cabinet meetings (although the latter can offer compelling demonstrations of 
historical imagination as well). 
Finally, I argue that the emergence of the AC not only had profound 
consequences on the relations between the U.S. and Italy, but it radically recast the place 
of the U.S. as well as Italy in the international arena. In the case of Italy, however, this 
process of ‘Atlanticization’ turned out to be complex and somewhat ambiguous 
adjustment. 
 
The Atlantic Community and the U.S. 
The influential journalist-philosopher Walter Lippmann was arguably the single 
individual who most contributed to the shaping of the AC. A public intellectual who 
came of age during the so-called Progressive Era and one of the founders of the New 
Republic, he later deserved the title of “unofficial- and often uninvited- public adviser to 
the makers of American foreign policy,” and through his syndicated columns became 
“the man that more than any other outside the government, influenced the dialogue in 
‘official’ Washington.”1  
                                                 
* draft – please do not quote or circulate  
 
1 Barton J. Bernstein, “Walter Lippmann and the Early Cold War,” in Thomas G. Paterson, Cold War 
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Interestingly enough, he first used the expression AC in 1917, a few months 
before U.S. soldiers went to fight on European soil - thus putting an end to the centuries-
long American isolationism. Lippmann had been an ardent supporter of the American 
intervention in the war and of Wilsonian idealism, that is the attempt by president 
Woodrow Wilson to seize the opportunity of the end of World War I to reform the 
international system by introducing an organization - The League of Nations - in order to 
introduce and enforce liberal-democratic principles and procedures in international 
affairs. Wilosn’s ultimate goal was “to make the world safe for democracy” in the wake 
of the self-destructive imperial inclinations of the European powers and of Bolshevik 
subversion (indeed, Lippmann is credited with having introduced this now classic 
Wilsonian formula as well). In a New Republic article of October 1917 Lippmann 
focused on the “Atlantic highway” connecting “Pan-America” to the European side of the 
“Western world” and accused Germany of disrupting it, thus making American 
intervention inevitable: “Now that [Germany] is seeking to cut the vital highways of our 
world we can no longer stand by. We cannot betray the Atlantic community by 
submitting. If not civilization, at least our civilization is at stake.”2  
In a nutshell, his quest for intervention contained some of the basic assumptions 
that would lead to the post-World War II idea of AC: the Atlantic Ocean as a link, rather 
than a barrier, between America and Europe; the crucial relevance of the transatlantic link 
for U.S. national security; the equation between security in the Atlantic and 
“civilization.” 
World War II presented Lippmann, and America, with a somewhat similar 
scenario: another “European” war, and Great Britain, now the only major liberal 
democracy left in the continent, urging American help in the name of common interests 
and, to some extent, Anglo-Saxon kinship. Except that now the bitter legacy of the late 
1910s, when Wilson had won the war and “lost the peace,” made the divide between 
isolationists and internationalists even deeper. Furthermore, World War II was an 
ideological, as well as a geopolitical conflict: what was at stake now was clearly much 
more than the old European balance of power. The threat of Nazism forced the U.S. to 
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reconsider its place in the world, specifically its relations with Central/Latin America on 
the one hand and with Europe on the other. Not surprisingly, such a re-consideration was 
particularly intense and explicit in geography and cartography. 
After the lost peace of Versailles (1919) and the defeat of Wilsonian idealistic 
universalism, the U.S. returned to isolationism and “hemispherism,” that is the belief that 
national interests were best served by a geopolitical focus on the American hemisphere. 
In terms of American foreign policy, this meant a revival of the Monroe Doctrine (1823), 
which postulated reciprocal non-interference both on the part of the U.S. in European 
affairs and on the part of European countries in the Western hemisphere. Even Franklin 
Roosevelt, an internationalist who had to wait Pearl Harbor (December 1941) in order to 
be able to convince the American people to enter the World War II, in previous years was 
very cautious in abandoning the dogma of hemispherism.3 However, before Japan’s 
attack, cartographers and geographers were already redefining U.S. position vis a vis the 
Atlantic Ocean and, consequently, Europe. 
What is interesting here is that we might assume that as far as maps are 
concerned, we can count on a high degree of “objectivity,” but this is not actually the 
case. Indeed, the very definition of a “Western hemisphere” was far from unproblematic 
as its canonic Eastern (i.e. Atlantic) limit - set at 20 West and 160 East - cut across or 
bordered islands which were historically and politically tied to European countries, like 
Cape Verde and the Azores (Portugal), Iceland and Greenland (Denmark). 
Map 1 is taken from an article published in July 1941 in Foreign Affairs. It includes the 
Danish possessions, but not the Portuguese ones, in the Western hemisphere.4 The 
political implications were obvious: Denmark had invaded by Germany in April 1940, 
therefore those who favored American intervention had a clear interest in presenting the 
fall of Denmark as a violation of the Western Hemisphere and consequently as a threat to 
U.S. security. Under the pressure of World War II, geography – and specifically the mid-
Atlantic line dividing the America and Europe - came to be a matter of interpretation. 
                                                 
3 John L. Harper, American Visions of Europe. Franklin D. Roosevelt, George F. Kennan, and Dean G. 
Acheson, Cambridge, Cambridge UP, 1994. 
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FDR took part in this contest of cartographic imagination by re-drawing this line so as to 
include the Azores as well as Iceland and Greenland, and sent his sketch to Winston 
Churchill to provide him with a picture of the eventual American range of action under 
the constrains of enduring isolationism.5 [Map 2] 
If the outbreak of World War II had blurred such a dividing line, Pearl Harbor 
erased it, thus paving the way to the idea of a Euro-American AC. In the age of airpower, 
hemispheric isolation could not deliver security anymore; on the other hand, the alliance 
with Great Britain, and consequently the Atlantic “highway,” was now of vital 
importance for the U.S. In the words of Helen Hill Miller of the pro-intervention National 
Policy Committee, “Instead of thinking of our continent as a body of land surrounded by 
water, we are coming to think of the Atlantic [and the Pacific] as bodies of water 
surrounded by land, of which our shores are a part.” And the great British geographer Sir 
Harold Mackinder referred to the Atlantic as the “Midland Ocean.”6 
It must be stressed that this ‘Atlanticization’ of America was by no means 
confined to academia, elite circles, and policymakers. Large circulation magazines like 
LIFE, Fortune, and Colliers played a crucial role in popularizing this new vision of 
America’s place in a unified world by distributing maps, world atlases, globes as 
supplements, usually with a fairly good commercial success given the widespread 
popular interest in the events of the war. [Pic 1] Such a need for a visual understanding of 
what was at stake in the war seemed to be so urgent that FDR in one of his most 
celebrated radio broadcast “fireside chats” explained the Anglo-American war strategy to 
the American people by constantly asking them to “look at the map,” in what turned out 
to be an unprecedented presidential lesson in geography.7  
However, the AC was not simply a matter of geography or geopolitics. Let’s go 
back to Lippmann. Like during World War I, he was among the staunchest supporters of 
                                                 
5 Alan K. Henrikson, “The Map as an Idea: The Role of Cartographic Imagery during the Second World 
War,” The American Cartographer, Vol. 2 N.1, 1975, 29.  
 
6 quoted in Henrikson, cit., 32-33. 
 
7 LIFE, “How To Assemble the Globe,” March 1 1943; Franklin D. Roosevelt, “On Progress of the War,” 
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American intervention in the European theatre. In his syndicated columns8 and in other 
writings he called for the recognition of the AC as an entity that shared cultural and 
historical bonds as well as geopolitical interests. In the process, he contributed to the 
ongoing fascination with geography by writing in a LIFE magazine article in June 1940 
that “it is manifest that in seeking to separate ourselves from the great wars of Europe, we 
cannot rely upon the Atlantic Ocean. It has never been a barrier in the involvement in 
wars. Our geography books are as misleading as our history books.”9 He articulated his 
vision of an AC in U.S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic (1943), in which he 
reiterated the familiar arguments about the key role to be played by the wartime alliance 
between the U.S., Canada, and Great Britain, and then dealt with the issue of the 
membership of the AC: France, Spain, Portugal, the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, and 
Norway, as far as continental Europe was concerned. Lippmann was thus able to 
conclude that such a “system of security” was based on solid historical grounds: “The 
nations of the New World are still vitally related to precisely those nations of the Old 
World from which that originated…The original geographic and historic connections 
across the Atlantic have persisted. The Atlantic Ocean is not the frontier between Europe 
and the Americas. It is the inland sea of a community of nations allied with one another 
by geography, history, and vital necessity.”10  
One of the issues I am dealing with in this research is the peculiar relation among 
the “English speaking peoples” as the core of the AC. Fearing that his call for a 
transatlantic entity could be seen as a British-American “plan of domination or scheme of 
empire,” Lippmann introduced the idea of Community as a way to emphasize the relative 
degree of freedom and equality enjoyed by its members more than their reciprocal 
obligations and its hierarchical structure. 
                                                 
8 “Today & Tomorrow,” Lippmann’s column for the New York Herald Tribune, was syndicated to as many 
as 200 newspapers, with a combined readership of more than 10 millions, see Ronald Steel, Walter 
Lippmann and the American Century, Boston: Little, Brown, 279-80. 
 
9 Walter Lippmann, “America in the World,” LIFE, June 3, 1940. 
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Again, the influence of Lippmann’s and others’ arguments was not limited to elite 
foreign policy circles; on the contrary, it was part of a national conversation of America’s 
place in the world: U.S. Foreign Policy jumped on top of the bestseller list, an abridged 
version of it was distributed by the Reader’s Digest, and the Ladies’ Home Journal 
transformed it in a seven-page cartoon strip.11  
 
The Atlantic Community and Italy 
What is the place of Italy in this context? In the war years, as we have seen, the 
quest for an AC turned out to be intertwined with the wider interventionist, anti-
isolationist campaign that urged the U.S. to live up to its responsibilities in world affairs, 
therefore it implied the expansion of American influence abroad. However, the very idea 
of AC also implied a spatial limitation of American involvement in world affairs, which 
was absent in classic Wilsonian idealism as well as in other visions of the American role 
in the world that emerged in the 1940s, whose distinct universalistic thrust finally led to 
the creation of a new world government: the United Nations (1945).12 Lippmann, 
disappointed by the failure of Wilson’s League of Nations, had turned to hard-line 
realpolitik. As Allies’ victory approached and planning for the postwar world became an 
issue in international politics, he dismissed the idea of a world government as hopelessly 
naïve and called for a postwar order based on mutual recognition and negotiations among 
“spheres of influence,” one of them being of course the AC. This brings us back to both 
the membership and the historical-political boundaries of the AC and, consequently, to 
the ambiguous place of Italy in it. 
Italy had been generally considered a “Western” and of course a “European” 
country, as so much of its history, art, and culture laid at the heart of canonic definitions 
of “Western civilization.” However, at a time when the West was being defined in 
Atlantic and liberal-democratic terms, Italy’s geography and the legacy of Fascism were 
                                                 
11 Steel, Lippmann and the American Century, 406. Individuals and organizations advocating American aid 
to Britain and intervention in the war had been making similar arguments, notably William Allen White’s 
Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies and the Century Group, which had Henry Luce among 
its members. 
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obvious liabilities. Furthermore, its poor performance in the two world wars did not 
contribute to its reputation as a strong ally, and in the aftermath of the war the influence 
of Communists and pro-Soviet Socialists made it a permanent source of worries in 
London and in Washington. Finally, in sectors of the wartime American foreign policy 
elite there were remnants of an old Anglo-Saxonist, racialized view of the world which 
postulated a positive correlation between people’s “whiteness” and their attitude to 
democratic self-government. While seldom voiced openly, this mind-set lingered, and 
arguably had some consequences on American attitudes on Italian affairs, given the fact 
that the whiteness of Italian immigrants in America, let alone their fitness to self-
government, had been quite a controversial issue in previous decades.13 
In the final part of the paper I will deal with the way in which this ambiguity 
regarding Italy permeates American public discourse. But the uncertainty about Italy’s 
Atlantic status deeply affected politics and diplomacy as well, especially in 1949 when 
the loose AC framework found an institutional counterpart in the creation of the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). From an Italian point of view, we are usually 
concerned with the “choice” of the Italian government to join the Atlantic Alliance, or 
with American interference and hegemonic policies toward Italy. But from an 
international perspective the real issue at stake was the acceptance of Italy. Secretary of 
state Dean Acheson listed the pros and cons of the Italian inclusion in NATO in a 
memorandum to president Truman. Among the eight “arguments against inclusion” are 
the following: 
“Italy is not physically on the North Atlantic Ocean.  
In two world wars Italy has shown herself to be an ineffectual and undependable ally. 
having switched sides in both wars. 
                                                 
13 Matthew Frye Jacobson, Whiteness of a different colo : European immigrants and the alchemy of race, 
Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1998. On race and U.S. foreign policy see, among many others, the seminal work 
of Michael Hunt, Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy, New Haven: Yale UP, 1987 and Gerald Horne, “Race 
from Power: U.S. Foreign Policy and the General Crisis of White Supremacy,” Diplomatic History, Vol. 23 
n.3, summer 1999. Specifically on the U.S. and Italy see Marco Mariano, “From Anglo-Saxonism To Cold 
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In 1940 Italy stabbed France and the UK in the back.”14  
Finally, Italy was accepted as a member of NATO precisely because of its 
weakness: Especially Americans feared that keeping Italy out would only strengthen its 
neutralist, if not pro-Soviet, forces. As for another architect of postwar American foreign 
policy, George Kennan, he opposed the creation altogether, on the grounds that it was 
much preferable to have “a sort of intimate Atlantic union, prompted by ‘the logic of 
history,’ between the United States, Canada, and Britain” allied with a separate “Western 
European federation.” In any case Kennan had more sympathies for Antonio Salazar’s 
Portugal than for the mess of postwar Italy.15 
If a geographic definition of AC was questionable, ideas about its history, 
tradition, and culture were even more so. Exposing the “ideological” nature of the AC is 
particularly important when we look at Italy, as I argue that precisely these ideological 
elements – ideas of history, tradition, culture - played a key role not only in the specific 
issue of Italy’s inclusion in NATO, but more generally in its enfranchisement and re-
integration in the international community after Fascism and the defeat in World War II. 
In the above-mentioned memorandum to president Truman, one of the arguments for the 
inclusion of Italy in the Atlantic Alliance was that “Italy is by race, tradition, and 
civilization a natural member of the Western European community.”16 
 
The Atlantic Community and Photojournalism: LIFE  
This is the reason why the empirical side of my research focuses on popular 
magazines and specifically on photojournalism, which I consider an extremely influential 
medium in promoting mind-sets, national identities, and visions of the world and of other 
nations. Arguing that the notion of AC reshaped post-war American national identity is 
an over-statement of my case. However, America’s new position as the leader of the AC 
                                                 
14 Memorandum by the Secretary of State,  March 2 1949, Foreign Relations of the United States, Vol. IV, 
Western Europe, 1949. 
 
15 Anders Stephanson, Kennan and the Art of Foreign Policy, Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1989, 138. The best 
account of the relation between the United States and Italy during these years is Mario Del Pero, L’Alleato 
scomodo. Gli USA e la DC negli anni del centrismo (1948-1955), Rome: Carocci, 2001. 
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came to be one of the multiple identities of post-war America. In his work on national 
identity Benedict Anderson argues that print capitalism – the novel, the newspaper – 
“provided the technical means for ‘re-presenting’ the kind of imagined community that is 
the nation.” If this is true for the advent of printed matters, it is even more so for the news 
magazines and photojournalism of the 1940s and 1950, relying heavily on pictures. As 
Wendy Kozol points out in her study of LIFE as a vehicle of patriotism in postwar 
America, “visual media have even greater capacities to visualize social norms and ideals 
that form national identities…They construct an imagined community of the ‘free’ and 
‘Western’ world with shared concerns about the Cold War.” While photographs have 
been widely regarded as a guarantee of detached, factual objectivity, in fact their success 
in journalism, and especially in the popular press, since the early 20th century is largely 
due to their ability to satisfy the emotional needs of significant sector of the public 
opinion challenged by modernization and displaced by the decline of traditional 
community ties.17 
Furthermore, magazines – while rather overlooked as a source for historical inquiry – 
were still the primary source of information for Americans, besides radio, at a time when 
television was still on its way to control the media market and, most importantly, did not 
dedicate many resources to news programming (LIFE alone had a readership of about 
twenty millions).  
Finally, Henry Luce’s publishing empire – Time Inc. - is an interesting case for a 
study in international history. Time, founded in 1923, was the first modern news 
magazine; Fortune (1930) dealt mostly with business issues and targeted a more specific 
and conservative segment of the American readership; LIFE (1936) was the blueprint for 
photojournalism in the United States and, later, abroad. An Oxford-educated Anglophile 
who in his own way rediscovered Europe during and after World War II, Luce did not 
hesitate to enlist his magazines in foreign policy crusades, as it is shown by the intense 
Time Inc. interventionist campaign in the years 1939-41. Later, although he frankly 
                                                 
17 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism, 
London, Verso, 1991, p. 25; Wendy Kozol, LIFE’s America. Family and Nation in Postwar 
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detested FDR and the Democrats, he was nonetheless an open supporter of FDR and 
Truman administration’s internationalism and engagement in the European theatre. Given 
his inclination to choose journalists who saw the world the way he saw it, it is not 
surprising that Time in its first issue of 1950 elected Winston Churchill as “Man of the 
Half Century.” His magazines became an influential actor in the popularization of the 
“Atlantic community.” 
There is no such thing as a canonic definition of AC. Here I deal with fragments of 
ideas floating in public discourse rather than with a systematic political thought on 
international relations. In a 1941 LIFE article Lippmann focused, not surprisingly, on 
freedom: “for a century the nations, from Scandinavia to Argentine, which face the 
Atlantic Ocean have had an unparalleled opportunity to develop in freedom. Under the 
protection of sea power in the hand of free government the shores and the waters of the 
Atlantic have been the geographic center of human liberty.” A few years later, he saw the 
AC as defined basically in historical-philosophical terms: its members “adhere to their 
historic tradition: that the state exists for man, and not man for the state; that the state is 
under the law, not above it; and that the individual person has inalienable rights.” Then 
he added a religious/geographic twist:  
 
The national differences within the Atlantic region are variations within the same cultural 
tradition. For the Atlantic Community is the extension of Western or Latin Christendom from the 
Western Mediterranean into the whole basin of the Atlantic Ocean. Its frontiers, which are a 
fluctuating and disputed borderland in Germany and Central Europe, still follow roughly the 
frontiers of the western part of the Roman Empire. Beyond the Atlantic Community lies a world 




This search for a usable past in defining the AC is all the more evident with regards to 
Italy. In its editorials, reports, and pictures LIFE magazine relied heavily on the legacy of 
                                                 
18 Walter Lippmann, “The Atlantic and America,” LIFE, April 7 1941; ID, U.S. War Aims, Boston: Little, 
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ancient Rome and of Catholicism, and to a lesser extent on the Renaissance and later 
periods, so as to portray modern Italy as one of the main historical and “spiritual” sources 
of the AC. However, its coverage of current Italian affairs frequently pushed back Italy 
toward, if not beyond, the borders of the AC, due to its less than impressive democratic 
record, ongoing political instability, and poverty. Finally, the focus on Italian art, culture 
and glorious but vanished past, while intended to foster a sense of shared values and 
traditions, to some extent ended up reinforcing old attitudes and mind-sets about Italy as 
a somewhat exotic place, fundamentally different from the core of the AC, which was 
provided by the “English speaking peoples” of the Anglo-Saxon world. 
The enduring strength of the Anglo-American “special relationship” in the 1940s is 
aptly exemplified by the veneration of Winston Churchill. Luce, a Republican, obviously 
preferred the conservative Churchill to the liberal FDR. However, apart from reasons of 
political expediency, the English statesman, son of the American Jenny Jerome, came to 
embody the Anglo-American kinship. 
He enjoyed an immense personal prestige for Britain’s resistance to Germany’s 
aggression. When in March 1946 he delivered his famous “Iron Curtain” speech at 
Fulton, Missouri, in which he outlined its vision of Europe divided by a line running 
“from Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic,” LIFE portrayed him while looking 
at a statue of George Washington. [Pic 2] Coupling the statesman who doggedly 
defended British imperial rights and the hero of American independence had a particular 
meaning at this defining moment of the cold war. Although Anglo-American 
“reapproachment” in international affairs dated back to the end of the nineteenth century, 
it assumed a deeper meaning in post-World War II transatlantic relations, 
notwithstanding the partially unresolved issue of the British colonies. In mid-April 1948, 
when the Italian elections marked one of the peaks of cold war tensions, LIFE’s cover 
featured Churchill in military uniform as an introduction to the first installment of his war 
memoirs, which came complete with a photo-essay on “Mr. Churchill’s Background” 
emphasizing both his aristocratic rank and the continuity of British international power 
and prestige.19 
                                                 
19 LIFE, “Churchill Speaks,” March 18 1946; “Mr. Churchill’s Background,” April 19 1948.  
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Churchill’s myth was by no means the only channel to convey the idea of Anglo-
American kinship. A January 1945 photo-essay featured an “Anglo American Romance,” 
where the encounter between an American soldier and a British young woman is re-
enacted as to evoke natural family ties between the two nations, as well as to make clear 
the new hierarchy in the international arena. [Pic 3] However, such a “fraternal 
association,” frequently referred to in terms of “blood” and “race,” now had to be framed 
in the wider Atlantic context.20  
On the contrary, Italy in the 1940s provided a striking contrast between its glorious 
past and its troubled present. Time Inc.’s magazine tried to make sense of this 
contradiction, but in so doing made it to some extent more blatant. A poverty-stricken 
nation with no firm leadership, marred by political violence and social conflict, and for 
obvious reasons a paria in the international community, LIFE’s Italy qualified as a fully 
Western/Atlantic nation basically as the home of the Catholic Church, the heir of ancient 
Rome, and the land of inestimable art treasures. 
LIFE’s report on the foundation of NATO [Pic. 4] implicitly located Italy on the 
borders of the Atlantic space. Not included among the eight founding members of the 
treaty, Italy had “requested membership in Atlantic group,” the caption said, while the 
two pictures portray the statesmanlike posture of the founding members of the AC on the 
one hand and the Communist-provoked “riots” in Rome on the other.21 Indeed, the 
persistent fear of pro-Soviet subversion and, even worse, of a legitimate victory of the 
Communist and Socialist left at the polls- at least until April 18, 1948 – strongly 
contributed to place Italy out of the Atlantic space in American mental maps. In March 
1946 a LIFE editorial denouncing Soviet “aggression” quoted senator Vandenberg 
wondering: “What is Russia up to now? …We ask it in Manchuria, we ask it in Eastern 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
20 LIFE, “LIFE Records an Anglo American Romance,” January 1 1945; “England. Its Old Schools Bred a 
rare race of rulers,” June 3 1940. For Anglo-American relations as transatlantic relations see Lippmann 
and, among others, John Jessup, “America and the Future,” LIFE, September 20 1943.  On the long-term 
cultural premises of the Anglo-American wartime alliance see Stuart Anderson, Race and 
Reapproachment. Anglo-Saxonism and Anglo-American Relations, 1895-1904, Rutherford, Fairleigh 
Dickinson UP, 1981. 
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Europe and the Dardanelles. We ask it in Italy… We ask it in Iran. We ask it in 
Tripolitania. We ask it in the Baltic and the Balkans. We ask it in Poland…We ask it in 
Japan.”22 
In the late 1940s the cold war was waged with economic as well as ideological 
weapons. Time Inc. had been an outspoken advocate of the Marshall Plan, and frequently 
displayed a typically Republican, pro-business attitude: investments of American 
corporations abroad were the best way to generate jobs, create wealth and stop 
Communist influence. In another LIFE editorial, Italy seemed to belong to a context of 
extra-European, developing nations suited for “colonial” development policies. The 
comment praised American investments in the Milan-based chemical plant SniaViscosa 
for reducing unemployment and the danger of subversion (“maybe there are a few less 
Commies in SniaViscosa today”), then went on illustrating the potential for American 
business in Venezuela and Liberia, and finally concluded on a blatantly paternalistic note: 
“Our businessmen are following the trail blazed by American colonial policy at its best, 
as in the Philippines - tutelage, not domination. Let us cheer them on and pray they have 
time to spread wealth wherever wealth is wanted.”23  
Paternalism, not exactly a blueprint for relations among members of the civilized AC, 
was indeed of some use in the Italian case. Writer John Hersey, in Sicily with the 
American troops in the summer of 1943, wrote of the American mayor of Licata 
“bringing some American democracy,” like many other Americans had done in the past 
in other areas of the world. Hersey emphasized “American idealism and generosity 
bordering on sentimentality, the innate sympathy of common blood that so many 
Americans have to offer over here.” Here Italian-Americans’ “blood” provides the 
grounds for a “special relationship” which is of course much different from the Anglo-
American one. Meanwhile, in the same issue, the photographs of Robert Capa offered 
                                                 
22 LIFE, “‘Getting Tough’ with Russia,” March 16 1946 (Vandenberg’s concerns included Canada and the 
U.S. as well, but only as targets of Soviet espionage).  Zachary Karabell’s Architects of Intervention. The 
United States, the Third World and the Cold War, 1946-1962, Baton Rouge, Louisiana State UP, 1999 
finds analogies in U.S. policies toward Greece, Italy and extra-european countries like Iran, Guatemala, 
Lebanon, Cuba, and Laos. 
 
23 LIFE, “‘Capitalist Imperialism’ at Work,” April 12 1948. The article also mentioned similar investment 
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images of American hegemony and benevolence, both in the public and in the private 
sphere.24 [Pics 5a/5b] 
While rescued from Fascism, Italy was still lacking a strong, dependable, pro-
Western political leadership. The Savoy dynasty enjoyed British, but not American 
sympathies, and the June 1946 referendum ousting the monarchy offered the opportunity 
for an unequivocal historical appraisal. Blaming the Savoy for making Italy a “third class 
empire” and precipitating the nation into “moral, military and economic collapse,” LIFE 
stressed that “despite bullying tactics, the army of the House of Savoy invariably bit the 
dust: Adowa (1896), Caporetto (1917), Guadalajara (1937), Greece (1940), Africa and 
Sicily (1940-43)”25 in words which anticipated Acheson’s 1949 remark on the flawed 
Italian military record as an argument against Italy’s inclusion in NATO. 
Nor pro-Western parties and leaders, namely the Christian Democrats and De 
Gasperi, raised LIFE’s enthusiasm. An alarmed “Pre–Election Report on Italy” of April 
1948 dedicated the smallest photographs to rival leaders Palmiro Togliatti (PCI) and 
Alcide DeGasperi (DC), and described the latter as “utterly honest and sincere, painfully 
humorless and uninspiring… A shrewd party leader, a weak orator and a fair 
parlamentarian, his appeal to the Italian people is essentially negative, based on the fear 
of alternatives to his victory.” By contrast, the story carried a one page and a half picture 
of Pope Pius XII at the balcony in Easter Sunday, while at the beginning of a long chapter 
on the “Catholic Action” the text made clear that, notwithstanding “superstition” and 
Madonnas popping up almost everywhere in pre-election days, “There remains only one 
faith and force in Italy powerful enough – perhaps – to deny Nenni and Togliatti their 
Roman triumph. This is the Catholic Church.” A few page later, the “Picture of the 
Week” showed Secretary of State George Marshall praying in the cathedral of Bogota’, 
Colombia. In the same vein, in a later article on the Italian elections, pictures emphasized 
the massive contribution of priests and nuns during election day.26 [Pic 6]   
                                                 
24 LIFE, “AMGOT at Work,” and “The Surrender of Palermo,” August 23 1943. 
 
25 LIFE, “Italians Send Their King Packing,” June 24 1946. 
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During and after the war, the Pope emerged in LIFE magazine as the most prominent 
spiritual leader of the Atlantic world, almost like a religious counterpart to Churchill. It 
was the reflection of an unprecedented, multidimensional shift in the relations between 
America and the Catholic world, which had began in 1939 when FDR appointed Myron 
Taylor as his “personal representative” in the Vatican, thus putting an end to the long-
lasting, deep distrust between Washington and Rome. Roosevelt’s move, which caused 
widespread outcry in the U.S., was aimed basically at securing a source of information in 
a sensitive, if unofficial, meeting point for international diplomacy. When Allied victory 
was approaching and it became gradually clear that the wartime alliance with the Soviet 
Union would soon turn into the next “clash of civilizations,” cooperative relations with 
the Vatican became an asset for American foreign policy and postwar planning. 
Meanwhile, in the home front, American Catholics found themselves among the more 
enthusiastic participants in the anti-Communist crusade that culminated in McCarthyism, 
thus partially overcoming decades of religious, and ethnic, prejudice. And in universities, 
American Catholics like the Columbia historian and former Ambassador to Spain Carlton 
J. Hayes were among the most outspoken proponents of a devoutly Christian AC.27  
Given the persistent Vatican’s skepticism regarding individual rights, capitalism, and 
representative democracy, that is some of the very pillars of the AC (let alone Catholic 
Church’s all-out, enduring opposition to the penetration of the secularized, consumer-
oriented American way of life in Europe and Italy), this unusual American-Vatican 
harmony was largely a marriage of convenience based on cold war imperatives. 
However, the Pope - and Rome - became now a familiar presence for LIFE readers, and 
Italy came to be recognized as one of the great sources of Western/Atlantic spirituality. 
Immediately after the liberation of Rome the pompous ceremonies in St. Peter’s, which 
not long before were seen as the stylistic trademark of Papist absolutism, were now 
regularly featured in photo-essays which magnified Vatican’s grandeur as well as its 
                                                 
27 Ennio Di Nolfo, Vaticano e Stati Uniti (1939-1952). Dalle carte di Myron Taylor, Milano, Franco 
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increasing openness to America the Anglo-Saxon world. A frequent co-protagonist of 
LIFE stories was Cardinal Spellman of New York, a key figure in the shaping of an 
ethnic/ideological cold war coalition in postwar America.28 [Pics 7a/7b]  
 The fact that Henry Luce, the son of a Protestant missionary, was himself a man of 
strong religious convictions, also contributed to this religious revival, which involved the 
Protestant churches as well. LIFE frequently carried stories of meeting among religious 
leaders mobilizing “for peace,” and expressions like “mission” and “faith,” come to be 
commonly associated with foreign policy analyses. An article by the hawkish John Foster 
Dulles, later Secretary of State in the Eisenhower administration, was introduced by a full 
page photograph of a Congregationalist mass in, of all places, Plymouth, Massachusetts 
while the caption found the way to relate “religious rededication” with “individual 
freedom” as an “inalienable right of man.”29 [Pic 8]  
The Catholic Church, an apparently timeless presence in Italian history, epitomized 
continuity and tradition. This brings us to another source of a usable Italian past: ancient 
Rome as one of the great inspirations of Western civilization and the AC. Americans’ 
fascination with the classic world and particularly republican Rome has a long story 
dating back to the revolutionary period of the 1770s. In the early cold war years this 
fascination became more explicit: as the U.S. was assuming a somewhat imperial role in 
world affairs and was facing what was being defined as a mission to defend and lead the 
AC, the Italian past provided an excellent repository of symbols and historical 
precedents, which helped the American public opinion to make sense of the 
unprecedented American involvement in international affairs. In this respect, the 
inclusion of Italy in the AC proved to be a very helpful resource. 
The liberation of Rome in June 1944 provided an ideal opportunity to formulate this 
kind of discourse. The almost contemporary D-Day in the beaches of Normandy was a 
                                                 
28 LIFE, “Papal Christmas,” January 15 1945; “The Pope Creates New Cardinals,” March 11 1946. On 
Spellman see “Archibishop’s Travels,” September 20 1943; “The Concistory,” May 13 1946. 
 
29 LIFE, “Protestants Plan for Peace,” and “Getting Tough with Russia,” March 18 1946; “Western Faith,” 
March 21 1949; “God’s Underground. What Would Happen If It Rose in Communist Russia-and in the 
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much more remarkable achievement in strictly military terms, but the entrance of Allied 
troops in the “eternal city” offered LIFE an incomparable stage and irresistible photo-
opportunities. “The strange sight of Americans capturing the city that once was the center 
of the world, the Caput Mundi” featured U.S. soldiers photographed against the backdrop 
of the Colosseum and Roman archs, as well the omnipresent St. Peter’s. [Pics 9a/9b] In 
the same issue, the editorial made clear the connection between Roman past and 
American present. After confirming that “the Rome that speaks more clearly to 
Americans today is the golden age of the ancient republic,” a chapter of the editorial 
under the title “Roman Law and American Freedom” singled out “the ideas of justice 
under the law” as Rome’s most precious legacy. Americans, “heirs of the Roman law,” 
had to build on that legacy in order to secure to all mankind “the idea of freedom as a 
natural right of all men.” This was the aim that now justified American leadership of the 
Western world and possibly beyond it: just like Caesar’s Rome had ruled on the 
Mediterranean world, after World War II “the ‘Atlantic Community’ may be similarly 
united under the sway of Great Britain and the U.S., which are at least as akin as Greece 
and Rome. As Rome transmitted Greek culture to the barbarians of Europe, so may 
America be destined to be the bridge between Europe and the emerging civilizations of 
Asia.” Similarly, although with a Hellenic twist, the landing in Sicily one year before had 
evoked visions of an American international mission whose lineage went back to ancient 
Greece.30   
The analogy between the Italian past and the American present relied on the 
Renaissance as well. The first installment of an ambitious “History of Western Culture” 
focused on Italy and specifically on Piccolomini, depicted as a successful self-made man 
comparable to present-day Americans: “Like many a successful American businessman 
who bequeaths public libraries or school buildings to the places where he lived and 
worked, Piccolomini, after he became Pope, took pride in beautyfing Pienza…and 
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Siena.”31 Analogies were found everywhere, so much so that “some of Italy looks like 
home to U.S. soldiers.”32 A June 1944 photo-essay intent on showing that various New 
York landmarks, including Columbia Low Library, had been inspired by masterpieces of 
Italian architecture went so far as to couple New York’s skyline with San Gimignano. 
[Pic 10] 
However, the emphasis on the Italian past as a source of Western/Atlantic values 
ended up exposing Italy’s present tragedies and coming political irrelevance. In August 
1943 aerial photographs presented six Italian cities as the “world’s best stage set for great 
and sad deeds,” while the caption underscored that these stages “had notably failed to 
inspire greatness in modern Italy.” [Pic 11] To some extent, such emphasis on artistic and 
touristic landmarks also ended up reflecting and reinforcing stereotyped views of Italy 
that stressed its distance from the Atlantic world. When a LIFE editorial greeted the end 
of the Fascist regime in the summer of 1943, it foresaw a chance for “the Italian 
people…to become themselves once more…For indeed the world has almost forgotten 
what Italian are really like – a lovable, laughing people…They are not warriors…They 
are people of the sun…And this make them also the children of the arts - and, above all, 
of songs…They sing them under the bright Mediterranean stars, when the night is warm 
and heavy with blossoms…Song is to them as natural as life itself.”33 
To conclude, it is hard to measure the impact of public discourse on international 
relations and vice-versa, but it is even harder to ignore the existence of a link connecting 
the two, especially in a country like the U.S. where – perhaps more than anywhere else - 
the realm of foreign policy is traditionally subject to the influence and control of public 
opinion, the prerogatives of Congress, and the dynamics of democracy. 
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